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Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24, Appellees submit the following
brief in response to the arguments set forth by Appellant.
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Statement of Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2(a)3(j), as this case was poured over from the Utah Supreme Court. See Utah Code Ann. §
78-2(a)-3Q).
Statement of the Case
The facts of this case are best set forth in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
law entered by the district court on March 7, 2007 (R. 586-590), quoted verbatim herein:
1.

In December 2005, Plaintiff filed a complaint against certain of the

Defendants, which resulted in a judgment being entered against Plaintiff for bad faith
filing pursuant to Utah Code section 78-27-26 (2004) in late 2006.
2.

Plaintiff did not satisfy the judgment entered against him in case number

050922650.
3.

In an effort to obtain at least partial satisfaction of the judgment in case

number 050922650, Defendants obtained a Writ of Execution and two Writs of
Garnishment in that action.
4.

Plaintiffs complaint, filed in this case, focused on these writs.

5.

Attached to Defendants' Writ of Execution were a notice of exemption and

a request for hearing.
6.

Plaintiff was provided with an opportunity to request, and did request, a

hearing on the writ from the trial court in case number 050922650, and the trial court
entertained his claims that certain property was exempt from execution.
4

7.

The judgment issued in case number 050922650 was never stayed or

otherwise suspended; thus, Defendants were entitled to seek satisfaction of their judgment
through the use of Writs of Execution and Garnishment.
8.

As permitted by rule, Plaintiff challenged Defendants right to execute on

certain property in case number 050922650, and after Defendants declared that they had
no interest in the majority of Plaintiffs property, the trial court ruled on Plaintiffs
objection and clearly identified the non-exempt property upon which Defendants could
execute.
9.

Following the hearing, Defendants executed only on the identified non-

exempt property.
10.

The filing of this current action was unnecessary to protect Plaintiffs

interests and property; all protections available to Plaintiff could have been, and were,
afforded to him in case number 050922650. In that case, Judge Hanson specifically
identified the non-exempt property on which Defendants could execute, and he
specifically limited the scope of Defendants' execution.
11.

The trial court in case number 050922650 was positioned to provide

Plaintiff with any additional protections, up to and including injunctive relief; however, it
granted Plaintiff no such relief.
12.

On the day before he filed the complaint in this case, Plaintiff transmitted

an electronic mailing to the Defendants, notifying them that he intended to file this
separate lawsuit and indicating that he was doing so, at least in part, to avoid contact with
5

Judge Hanson, whose decisions had dissatisfied him in the past. Plaintiffs message
concerning Judge Hanson was derogatory in nature.
13.

To support an abuse of process claim, Plaintiff must present some evidence

that Defendants obtained their Writs for some purpose other than that for which the writs
are intended. It is clear to this court that Defendants obtained their Writs for the proper
purpose of satisfying their existing, unsatisfied judgment against Plaintiff.
14.

Plaintiffs complaint fails to state a claim for abuse of process in that

Plaintiff has failed to plead any improper damages resulting from Defendants resort to
Writs of Execution and Writs of Garnishment.

Further, Plaintiff was provided due

process on this issue in case number 050922650, where the court provided Plaintiff with a
hearing and an opportunity to request any and all relief. It is clear from the record that
Defendants never took actual possession of, and never attempted to sell, any of Plaintiff s
exempt property, either before or after Plaintiff identified property as exempt.
15.

Plaintiffs claim for injunctive relief is equally without merit. Access to

injunctive relief requires Plaintiff to show that he has no other speedy remedy available to
him to seek the relief he seeks through the injunction. Plaintiff was provided with, and
availed himself of, another speedy remedy concerning Defendants' Writs, i.e., Plaintiff
was provided with a hearing by the trial court in case number 050922650 and permitted to
seek redress at that hearing.
16.

The court understands that the nature of this case is the result of emotion

and that Plaintiff is angry with the Defendants, at least in part due to Defendant Smoak's
6

ongoing representation of Plaintiffs' former domestic partner.
17.

Plaintiffs complaint lacks merit as a whole, and Plaintiff has failed to plead

sufficient facts to support any of the claims that may be included in his complaint.
18.

Further, the court finds that Plaintiff filed his complaint in bad faith, in part

to harass and delay Defendants, and in part to avoid any further involvement with Judge
Hanson.
R.587-89.
Summary of Arguments
Appellant argues that the district court improperly converted Appellees' motion to
dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. This argument is without merit. Both sides
filed affidavits in addition to their pleadings relating to the motion to dismiss.
Accordingly, the district court correctly determined that a determination pursuant to rule
56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was appropriate.
Appellant argues that the district court improperly entered a "judgment on the
pleadings" when no answer had been filed. Appellant also argues that Appellees'
defenses were improperly raised below because they were not asserted in an Answer.
These arguments are without merit. The district court converted a motion to dismiss into
a motion for summary judgment. No additional pleadings were required under Rule
12(b).
Appellant argues that his claims should have been dismissed without prejudice
rather than with prejudice. This argument is absurd, given that the claims were dismissed
7

because they were without merit and asserted in bad faith.
Last, Appellant argues the district court improperly granted summary judgment
and attorney fees. Appellant provides no basis for this argument. To the contrary, the
district court properly determined that this latest lawsuit was, once again, without merit.
Argument
I.

The District Court Properly Converted the Motion to Dismiss.

Appellant argues the district court erred when it treated a motion to dismiss as a
motion for summary judgment pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b). This argument is, on its
face, without merit. See State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888-89 (Utah 1989) (stating that
appellate court need not address every argument, issue or claim raised on appeal); see
also State v. Jones, 783 P.2d 560, 565 (Utah App. 1989) (appellate court will not engage
in "unnecessary verbiage" to address meritless argument), affd, 808 P.2d 1056 (Utah
1991)
Rule 12(b) provides in relevant part:
If, on a motion asserting the defense... to dismiss for failure of the pleading
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule
56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all
material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b); see also Walter v. Stewart, 2003 UT App 86, % 15 n.l, 67 P.3d
1042; Thayne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874 P.2d 120, 124 (Utah 1994).
Appellees filed a motion to dismiss on December 18, 2006.
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See R. 9-10.

Appellees filed the Affidavit of Jeffrey L. Silvestrini in support of this motion. R. 11-16.
In response, Appellant filed multiple affidavits. See R. 169-213; 214-267. Accordingly,
the Court, after hearing the matter, see R. 586, determined "because materials outside the
pleadings were submitted by both parties, the Court deems it appropriate to treat
Defendants' motion as one for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule
56..." Id.
Appellant has made no showing that this determination was inappropriate or
affected the decision in some prejudicial manner. To the contrary, this determination was
proper. See Walter v. Stewart, 2003 UT App 86 at f 15 n.l ("Stewart and Walter
submitted affidavits that were not excluded by the trial court. The trial court therefore
properly treated the motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment.");

Thayne v.

Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874 P.2d at 124 ("because Beneficial presented evidence outside
the pleadings, which the district court did not exclude under rule 12(c), the motion is
properly treated as a motion for summary judgment"); Tuttle v. Olds, 2007 UT App 10, \
10, 155 P.3d 893 ("because Defendants' memorandum and attachments do not constitute
pleadings under rule 7(a), the trial court should have converted the motion into one for
summary judgment pursuant to rule 12(b)."). Accordingly, the district court's decision
should not be disturbed.
II.

Appellant's Second and Third Arguments are Nonsensical
and Without Merit

Appellant's second argument seems to allege that there cannot be a judgment on

9

the pleadings when no answer is filed. There is no support for this argument;
indeed, it is nonsensical. By rule, motions to dismiss "may at the option of the pleader"
be asserted before an Answer is filed. Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b). The same is - necessarily true for motions that are converted to summary judgment motion pursuant to rule 12(b).
Appellant's third argument seems to allege that defenses were improperly raised
below because they were not asserted in an answer. Appellant then argues that such
defenses were waived because they were not asserted in an answer.

Once again,

Appellant misconstrues the very nature of rule 12, which allows the assertion of defenses
before an Answer is filed. See id.
Accordingly, Appellant's second and third arguments are spurious and without
merit.
III.

Appellant's Claims Were Properly Dismissed With Prejudice.

Appellant's fourth argument is that his claims should have been dismissed without
prejudice rather than with prejudice. Appellant sets forth no basis for this argument. The
district court granted Appellees' motion to dismiss on the ground that Appellant's
underlying Complaint was without merit and filed in bad faith. See R 589. It is absurd to
argue that a dismissal on this basis should have been "without prejudice," enabling
Appellant to refile a meritless Complaint.
IV.

Summary Judgment and Attorney Fees Were Proper.

Appellant's fourth and fifth arguments address the same or similar issues whether the district court properly granted summary judgment and attorney fees to
10

appellees. These issues are improperly briefed and should be dismissed for that reason
alone. See State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304 (Utah 1998); Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961
P.2d305,313 (Utah 1998).
In any event, these arguments are without merit. Appellant's Complaint alleged
certain improprieties in relation to a garnishment issued by Appellees. See R. 1-8. These
garnishment proceedings related to yet another bad faith Complaint Appellant filed
previously (case no. 050922650). See R. 587-89. The district court held that such
challenges should have been asserted - and in fact were asserted - in a post-judgment
proceeding relating to case no. 050922650. R. 587 ("Plaintiff was provided with an
opportunity to request, and did request, a hearing on the writ from the trial court in case
number 050922650, and the trial court entertained his claims that certain property was
exempt from execution.") Appellant had no basis to assert anew his challenge to the writ.
Thus, the district court properly determined that this latest lawsuit was without basis and
properly dismissed the same. See R. 589-90; see also Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Christiansen
v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 2006 UT App 180, f 6, 136 P.3d 1266 (stating summary
judgment is appropriate against a party who "fails to set forth facts sufficient to establish
the existence of an element essential to that party's case"); Reagan Outdoor Advertising,
Inc. v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776, 779 (Utahl984) (stating that a "major purpose of
summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trial by allowing the parties to pierce the
pleadings to determine whether there is a genuine issue to present to the fact finder.").
Based on these findings, the district court also properly awarded fees pursuant to
11

Utah Code section 78-27-56. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (2006). Section 78-27-56
provides, in relevant part: "In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's
fees to a prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action
was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith...." Id. "In order to award
attorney fees under this provision, a trial court must determine both that the losing party's
action or defense was 'without merit' and that it was brought or asserted in bad faith."
Still Standing Stable, LLC v. Allen, 2005 ut 46, 7, 122 P.3d 556 (citing Cady v. Johnson,
671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983)). The district court properly made both determinations.
See R. 589. Appellant is unable to show these determinations were incorrect.
Accordingly, Appellant has provided this Court no reason to disturb the district
court's determinations.1

REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES
Appellees were awarded attorney fees below pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2756. Accordingly, they are entitled to attorney fees on appeal. See Pack v. Case, 2001 UT
App 232, Tf 39, 30 P.3d 436 ( "When a party who received attorney fees below prevails on
appeal, the party is also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal." (Internal
quotations and citation omitted.)).
The Court should be aware, however, that on August 16, 2007, Appellant filed for

Appellant sets forth two final arguments regarding the merits of the garnishment
itself. These issues are not properly before this Court. Indeed, this Court already
determined that such issues were moot because Appellees did not execute on the property
in question. See Bryner v. Smoak, 2008 UT App 81 (mem.) (per curiam).
12

bankruptcy protection with the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah,
case numbered 07-23795 JAB.

Accordingly, Appellees' request for fees, although

allowed by Utah law, is made herein only as allowed by the Bankruptcy Code and to the
extent it is not prohibited or otherwise affected by the automatic stay.
CONCLUSION
Appellant fails to set forth any reason to disturb the district court's decision in this
matter. Accordingly, the district court's determination should be affirmed and Appellees
are entitled to attorney fees incurred on appeal to the extent such fees are not prohibited
by the Bankruptcy Code.
DATED this jd

day of March, 2008
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.

Jeffrey L. Silvestrini
Attorneys for Appellees
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